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Abstract: Precipitated by rapid globalization, rising inequality, population growth,
and longevity gains, social protection programs have been on the rise in low- and
middle-income countries (LMICs) in the last three decades. However, the
introduction of public benefits could displace informal mechanisms for riskprotection, which are especially prevalent in LMICs. If the displacement of private
transfers is considerably large, the expansion of social protection programs could
even lead to social welfare loss. In this paper, we critically survey the recent
empirical literature on crowd-out effects in response to public policies, specifically
in the context of LMICs. We review and synthesize patterns from the behavioral
response to various types of social protection programs. Furthermore, we
specifically examine for heterogeneous treatment effects by important socioeconomic characteristics. We conclude by drawing on lessons from our synthesis of
studies. If poverty reduction objectives are considered, along with careful program
targeting that accounts for potential crowd-out effects, there may well be a net social
gain. (JEL D64, H31, H55, J14, J22, J26, O15, O16, R2)
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I.

Introduction
Many countries have enacted social programs in an effort to assist vulnerable groups

manage a wide array of risks – economic, social, political, health, and environmental. To this
end, large-scale social safety net programs were introduced in the post-Industrial Revolution
period and became especially prominent in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. In Europe,
nations enacted social welfare legislation as early as the 1880s1 and the United States
introduced sweeping social protection programs2 shortly after the start of the Great
Depression (Flora 2017). In contrast, the rise of social protection in developing countries did
not occur until late in the 20th century (World Bank 2001), and such programs were frequently
introduced in response to guidelines by international organizations.3 Around the same time,
the role of social protection in developing countries also increased following widespread
failure of growth-based structural adjustment policies.
In the last three decades, the rapid expansion of social protection in developing
countries can also be attributed to several economic forces. The first is globalization, which
exposed open economies to the volatility of global financial markets while simultaneously
creating opportunities for growth (Rodrik, 1998; 2001). In the 1980s and 1990s, many nations
in Latin America and East Asia experienced dramatic economic transformation. The 1997
financial crisis, however, precipitated sudden and severe economic setbacks in both regions.
The increased poverty laid bare glaring gaps in social protection (World Bank 2001). Second,
worsening inequality and the potential threat of social unrest impelled many leaders to
strengthen national social safety nets. In particular, following major financial crises, social
protection programs were introduced in Brazil (Britto 2008) and Indonesia (Sumarto et al.
2008). Third, the growing population size in East Asia, South Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa
also acted as a strong impetus for social protection. The world’s population has increased
fourfold in the past century.4 Two final forces, gains in longevity and declining fertility rates,
further contributed to aging population structures and expansions in social protection as many
1

Under Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, Germany was the first country to adopt a formal old-age social insurance program in 1889 (Williamson
and Pampel 1993).
2
By as early as 1931, the United States had witnessed a hundred bills that related to old-age pensions across 38 different state legislatures
(VCU 2019). The introduction of such social programs likely lead, according to The Luxembourg Income Study, to a decrease in the share of
elderly Americans who live in poverty from 24 percent to 12 percent over the years 1979 to 1987. Ahmad (1991) attributes this decline directly
to the growth in social security retirement benefits.
3
Mesa-Lago (2002) reviews the experience of Latin American countries – Chile, Uruguay, Argentina, Cuba and Brazil – that initiated various
forms of social programs as early as the 1920s.
4
Population projections predict sustained growth, from 6.7 billion in 2006 to 9.2 billion in 2050 (UN 2017).
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governments faced mounting pressure to tackle old-age poverty.5 All together, these forces
have unambiguously accentuated the need for more expansive safety nets, especially for the
expanding geriatric population.
This rapid demographic change will likely continue to see the expansion of safety net
programs as well as their associated fiscal burden across the developing world (World Bank
2017; Lustig 2010). If the costs in emerging economies mirror those of the OECD nations,
nations such as China could end up spending around 12 percent of GDP (World Bank
2018)—making it particularly important to focus on the cost-effectiveness of such programs.
This mounting fiscal burden will strain the resources in developing countries whose fiscal
capacities are already under immense stress.
The introduction of social protection could displace already existing informal
mechanisms for risk-protection, an issue that is especially salient in developing countries. The
possibility that public transfers displace existing private transfers, a scenario that is also
known as crowding-out6, could hamper the distributive impact of new public programs.
Crowding-out could occur if altruistic donors reduce their transfers as public interventions
increase the incomes of recipient groups. If the displacement of private transfers is large
enough, the expansion of social protection programs could even lead to a social welfare loss.7
Empirical estimates of the crowd-out effect from social programs in developed
countries suggest that behavioral responses to public programs are relatively small.8 However,
developed countries have a long history of public transfers that has gradually eroded informal
mechanisms. Therefore, the experience of industrialized countries may not be a useful guide

5

Over the last 50 years, life expectancy at birth has increased globally by 20 years (WHO 2003). The largest longevity gains have been in
developing countries: between 1950 and 2002, the longevity gain in the poorest developing countries has been 26 years. The increase of the
elderly as a fraction of total population has been especially pronounced in developing countries: the fraction of individuals aged 65 to 85
increased globally from 13 percent to 33 percent between 1950 and 2010 (World Bank 2017). Globally, the number of persons aged 80 and
older is projected to triple between 2017 and 2050, from 137 million to 425 million (UN 2017).
6
Crowding-out is the phenomenon whereby public sector spending (or involvement) reduces private forms of spending oriented towards the
same objective. Feldstein and Liebman (2002) review the literature on various forms of crowding out in the context of programs in high-income
countries.
7
Using data from the Philippines, Cox and Jimenez (1995) estimate that public provision of unemployment insurance displaced 91 percent of
private transfers. Similarly, Jensen (2003) and Maitra and Ray (2003) estimate that the provision of pension benefits to black South Africans
displaced 20 to 40 percent of private transfers to the elderly.
8
Numerous studies in developed countries examine for crowding-out of public transfers on familial transfers. Several empirical studies use
data from the U.S. and Germany (Cox & Jakubson, 1995; Reil-Held, 2006; Rosenzweig & Wolpin, 1994). For example, Cox and Jakubson
(1995) estimate that a one dollar increase in public welfare spending in the United States lead to a 12 cent reduction in remittances. Also, in
the U.S., Altonji, Hayashi, and Kotlikoff (1997) find that parents increase remittances to a child by 13 cents for every one dollar reduction in
that child’s income. Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1994) examine how the increase in government welfare aid influenced financial support for
young daughters and found that government transfers did displace the familial transfers from parents to their daughters. Using U.S. data,
Schoeni (2002) found a substantial crowding-out effect of public transfers in the form of unemployment insurance on familial transfers among
older parents to their adult children; the study’s estimate of the crowd-out effect is 20–40 percent for each dollar increase of unemployment
insurance. Reil-Held (2006) uses data from Germany and confirms earlier conjectures that the introduction of public pay-as-you-go pensions
reduced familial transfers from children to their parents.
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for studying the same phenomenon in developing countries.9 In fact, formal insurance markets
in the context of the developing world are thin and largely nonexistent (Roth, McCord, and
Liber 2007, pp.15-19). Instead, informally arranged insurance schemes play a predominant
role in providing support to those in need and can take the form of domestic or international
remittances, in-kind gifts, and subsidized loans. Furthermore, idiosyncratic demographics
such as large extended families, the prevalence of informal mechanisms for financial support,
and inter- or intra-household financial transfers in support of the elderly call for a case-bycase examination of the magnitude of crowding-out.
In this paper, we critically survey the recent empirical literature on crowding-out
induced by public policy, specifically focusing on the developing world. As noted earlier,
developing countries have experienced a rapid increase in social protection programs, leading
to an increase in the number of empirical studies concerning the impact on private transfers.
Moreover, because of leaps in the quality and availability of data, most of these new studies
directly test for crowding-out of private household transfers. We review and synthesize the
evidence from recent empirical studies, exclusively focusing on studies that use experimental
or quasi-experimental methods equipped to detect the causal effects of policy programs. We
pay close attention to how crowding-out varies by several categories: type of social
protection, identification strategy, geographic area, and contemporaneity. Furthermore, we
specifically examine whether studies test for heterogeneous treatment effects by socioeconomic factors. To this end, we report and discuss heterogeneous impacts by gender,
income, education, and urbanicity. Finally, and most notably, we draw important lessons
based on our review of the studies.
The design and targeting of social protection programs depend on the type of risks or
economic distress afflicting vulnerable groups. Broadly, risks can be classified by the level at
which they occur (i.e., micro, meso, and macro) and by the nature of the event (e.g., natural,
economic, political, social, health, and environmental). Micro risks are idiosyncratic and only
affect specific individuals or households. Meso shocks strike groups of households or larger
communities. Such shocks are common to all households in the group. Macro risks relate to
shocks that occur at the national or international level. To manage and cope with risks,
9

Empirical estimates of the crowd-out effect from social programs in developed countries suggest that behavioral responses to public programs
are relatively small, however, several important differences between developing countries and developed countries could result in differential
crowd-out effects: strength of family ties, tradition of filial piety, size of social program benefits, the duration, recency and history of the
introduction of public benefits, and individual altruistic preferences towards other family members.
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households and communities rely on both formal and informal strategies. Informal strategies
generally refer to arrangements among individuals and households without any formally
agreed on legal, financial, or enforcement framework. Private and informal transfers in
developing countries can substitute for functions that formal social protection programs
perform in high-income countries. Private transfers for old-age support, for example, act as
social security for households in developing countries. In a community where emergencies
occur on a small-scale, informal insurance may suffice. However, if a widespread shock
occurs, such as that wrought by an earthquake, informal networks will no doubt struggle to
respond as the networks of friends, relatives, and local community members are impacted
simultaneously (Landmann, Vollan and Frölich 2012).
As there is diversity in risk, so too is there in the set of social protection policies. In
this paper, we specifically focus on the intergenerational crowding-out of private transfers in
three categories: social assistance programs (including programs that target vulnerable groups
and communities), social security and pension programs, and other insurance programs.10 In
the social assistance category, we include transfer programs that are exclusively based on a
means-tested criterion. Such programs are usually targeted at low-income or vulnerable
groups. In the social insurance group, we include transfers that are based on events, such as
unemployment, disability, or age. 11,12 Social insurance programs rely on risk-pooling
mechanisms and are usually contributory in nature; beneficiaries receive benefits or services
in recognition of contributions to a scheme. We split the social insurance classification into
two groups; due to the rise of age-related programs, we report results from age-related social
protection programs separately. Therefore, the social security and pensions group in our
classification is exclusively comprised of programs for age-based events. The other social
insurance group incorporates programs such as health, unemployment or other insurance.13,14
We report two aspects of the crowding-out response: (1) the full magnitude of the
crowd-out effect (which incorporates both the probability of receiving any positive private

10
A more nuanced social protection categorization (ADB 2003) encompasses four activities: active labor market policies, social insurance
programs, social assistance and welfare service programs, and area-based schemes to address community vulnerability.
11
We use the definition of social insurance based on Nelson (2004), Baicker and Chandra (2008), Chetty and Finkelstein (2013), and Ziebarth
(2018).
12
Programs exclusively means-tested programs are excluded from this group.
13
We follow the standard definition of such programs, which entails a formal enaction based on statutes, explicit provision based on income
or prior contributions, financing by taxes, and a defined target group. We exclude pension programs from this group and present estimates for
aging-related or pension programs as a standalone category.
14
Ghana first legislated its National Health Insurance Scheme in 2003. The law was passed as an alternative to the existing “cash and carry”
system (Strupat and Klohn 2018). In China, demographic pressures lead to the creation of the New Rural Society Endowment Insurance
Program (Yifan 2014).
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transfers and the amount of private transfers received by those who receive positive transfers),
and (2) only the likelihood of receiving any positive informal private transfer (also referred to
as the extensive margin). Our synthesis of this growing body of empirical estimates reveals
several major takeaways. The evidence is overwhelming that public benefits are indeed likely
to result in displacement effects, in some settings as high as 91 percent. This pattern
somewhat defies that of developed countries as reviewed by Feldstein and Liebman (2002).
Although some studies in developed countries show considerable crowding-out, the overall
pattern based on the experience of developing countries points to larger estimates. Second, the
presence of the behavioral response is robust to the type of social protection offered. Although
there appears to be some variation across program types, we note consistent evidence of a
sizable crowd-out effect induced by all social protection types. Third, the crowd-out response
can vary by important socio-economic characteristics of the public benefit recipients. In
particular, gender, educational status, and poverty status play an important role. Two studies
that provide results disaggregated by gender, one in Bangladesh (McKernan et al. 2005) and
the other in Mexico (Juarez 2009), report complementary results across social assistance and
pension programs, respectively. The pattern shows that if the recipient is male, the crowd-out
effect is larger than that of a female recipient. Interestingly, in Mexico (Juarez 2009), the
study reports results that illuminate the interplay between gender and poverty status: the
crowd-out for a recipient who is female and who is very poor is considerably larger than the
crowd-out for a recipient who is female and non-poor. Jensen (2003) and Amuedo-Dorantes
and Juarez (2015) report a gender-based pattern for the crowd-out effect of pension programs
in South Africa and Mexico, respectively. However, the pattern is reversed to the one we find
in McKernan et al. (2005) and Juarez (2009): for pension benefits, if the recipient is female,
the crowd-out effect is larger than if the recipient is male. Only one study, Nikolov and
Adelman (2019), disaggregates estimates of the crowd-out effect by poverty status: the results
show that the crowd-out effect is considerably larger for poor versus non-poor households.
The theoretical interplay between inter-household allocations and public transfers can
be ambiguous and has been the subject two major models: the altruism and exchange models.
Barro (1974) and Becker (1974) are among the first set of studies to conceptualize the
crowding-out hypothesis; in their frameworks, the studies posit that households behave like

5

infinitely-lived “dynasties”.15 The theoretical analysis in these studies model private savings
as a buffer for financial position changes in the public sector. In other words, in Barro
(1974)’s theoretical framework, a bond-financed tax cut leads to an equal ex ante increase in
private savings and thus can match the implicit future tax liability – a change in public debt
can result in no change to interest rates, output, and price levels.16 The main takeaway of
Barro (1974)’s model is that the provision of benefits due to government policies, such as
social security programs that influence the intergenerational distribution of resources, can be
undone by a substantial reduction in intergenerational private family transfers. An alternative
hypothesis that has been posited by the theoretical literature is that people derive utility from
giving and providing for others. The pleasure that individuals may derive stems from better
status or acclaim within their community, or they simply experience a "warm glow" from
having performed an ethically justifiable act for other community members. Altruism, a term
first introduced by Becker (1974) and Barro (1974), occurs when family members are
concerned with the economic and material well-being of others. In this setting, the utility of
the household member, the donor, positively depends on the well-being of another household
member, the recipient (Becker 1974). For upstream intergenerational transfers (i.e., transfers
that flow from children to parents), the more altruistic the children are, the higher the average
amount of private transfers that their parents receive. An important prediction underpinning
the altruism model for intergenerational transfers is that if a recipient’s income increases, then
the donors are less likely to transfer money to that recipient as their economic need has been
lowered. In the context of an altruistic framework with social protection programs, a similar
prediction holds: the child may lower the amount of his or her private transfers if their parents
start receiving public income benefits. If replacement of private transfers by public transfers
(i.e., crowding-out) is intense enough, there could be a dollar-for-dollar crowd-out, resulting
in no change to geriatric welfare.
In contrast to the altruistic model, Bernheim et al. (1985) and Cox (1987) model
private transfers as motivated by a system of explicit service exchanges between parent and
child. In this exchange model of private transfers, crowding-out may not occur. The

15

Barro (1974) focuses on whether an increase in government debt constitutes an increase in perceived household wealth. The model adds a
theoretical assumption of finite lives within the context of an overlapping-generations model of the economy. The paper demonstrated that
households would behave as though they were infinitely lived. Therefore, the net result of this behavior is that government bonds will generate
no marginal net-wealth effect in the presence of an operative chain of intergenerational transfers which connect current to future generations.
16
A critical point regarding whether this “equivalence” between public finance methods holds hinges on the belief that a change in the
composition of public spending acts as a significant mechanism of influence on the private sector economy.
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relationship between the welfare of the adult child and his parent can be expressed as the
welfare of children being dependent on the receipt of goods and services, such as household
chores and grandchildren care, provided by the parents to adult children. In this framework,
the higher the provision of service from parent to adult child, the lower the parental wellbeing and time for leisure. If the government introduces a monetary benefit to the parent, then
the parent is less dependent on the support of adult children. Consequently, based on the
assumptions in the exchange model, the parental terms of trade with adult children increases.
To sustain the same level of services as the level enjoyed before the introduction of public
benefits, adult children would then need to increase the amount of monetary transfers relative
to the period prior the introduction of public benefits. This increase in private transfers can
effectively be conceived as a “crowding-in” effect. Other theoretical studies17 that model
intergenerational economic dynamics also factor in bequest motives, arguing that the
introduction of program transfers need not necessarily crowd-out private intergenerational
support for parents as children may still have incentives to sustain private transfers in
expectation of parental inheritance (Lueth 2003; Nishiyama 2002).
Examining the empirical magnitude of the crowd-out effect is important for several
reasons. First, large crowd-out effects have implications for the efficiency of public transfer
programs; if the crowding-out is extremely large, larger than the public benefits provided to
beneficiaries, such programs may impose a net cost to those beneficiaries. Such displacement
effects could occur in response to a wide range of programs, including unemployment
insurance, social insurance, health insurance, cash transfers, or pension benefits. Second, the
presence of crowding-out also has important implications for program evaluation. An analysis
based on household data that tracks the household’s income from all sources, including public
transfer income, would overstate the distributional impacts of the public program, including
its impacts on poverty. Finally, crowding-out can provide important insights into the family
structure and intergenerational extended family behavior. For example, the behavioral
response to the introduction of programs can reveal whether and how households share

17

Another possibility that does not pit each framework against the other is that both the altruism and the exchange motives might coexist. In
this framework of co-existing motivations, the one set of motives may dominate over the other depending on the characteristics of the recipient
and/or donor. Consistent with this reasoning, Cox, Hansen, and Jimenez (2004) posit a dual system in which a household can switch between
the two regimes based on their poverty status. In this study, as the household economically transitions from low-income to high-income status,
the exchange model becomes a more compelling framework to explain what drives private transfers than the altruism framework, which
prevails when recipient income is low. Conceptually, in Cox, Hansen, and Jimenez (2004), private transfers exhibit diminishing returns. Based
on the assumptions in the model, if transfers are indeed motivated by exchange motives, then private transfers will initially increase and then
decrease, thereby exhibiting the inverted-U-shaped relationship between the amounts of private transfers and the recipient’s income.
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resources and the extent to which individuals remain interlinked within a larger social
framework.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we describe
the empirical evidence regarding intergenerational transfers associated with each of the three
social protection categories: social assistance, social security and pension programs, and other
social insurance programs. In Section III, we specifically highlight a comparison between the
crowding-out by program type and geographic area. In Section IV, we examine if there is any
empirical support for heterogeneous impacts by beneficiary or donor socio-economic
characteristics. The final section concludes.

II.

Intergenerational Transfers in Response to Social Protection Benefits

In this section, we review empirical studies that estimate the magnitude of the behavioral
response to social protection benefits. Regarding the crowd-out effect, we follow the conceptual
approach in McDonald and Moffit (1980) and Juarez (2009) who decompose the effect (in
response to income benefits) into two components:

For each individual i,

is individual pre-transfer income,

received from donors in other households, and

is the amount of private transfers

is a vector of baseline individual

characteristics. This expression shows the full crowd-out effect as the sum of the income
effect on the probability of receiving positive transfers and the income effect on the amount of
transfers received for those receiving positive transfers. Specifically, we report the full crowdout effect (

) and its extensive margin component (the probability of receiving any

positive private transfers). We follow this approach in reporting the magnitude of the
behavioral response to either a change in a continuous income variable or in response to a
binary indicator of program participation.18

18
Some studies opt to report results in response to income changes and some studies opt to report the crowd-out effect in response to program
participation.
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We first review overall program impacts in response to various types of interventions
(social assistance, social security and pension programs, and other insurance programs).
A.

Social Assistance Programs

In this section, we synthesize results from studies that specifically estimate the crowdout effects of private transfers in response to social assistance programs. Within this category,
we include programs that capture means-tested transfers, in cash or in-kind, regardless of the
demographic that these programs target. Across the studies that specifically analyze data in
response to social assistance programs, almost all studies detect some evidence of crowdingout. The range of empirical estimates of the crowd-out effect varies from zero percent to -88
percent, with a median of -0.457. Estimates also vary in their precision. In Table 1, we report
the estimates from studies using data in developing countries in the context of social
assistance programs. We report the full effect and its extensive margin component in response
to an income change (in columns 8 and 9) or in response to program participation (in columns
10 and 11).

[Table 1 about here]

Two of the studies that detect the smallest crowd-out effect are Van den Berg and
Cuong (2011), and McKernan et al. (2005). Each study imprecisely estimates a crowd-out
effect of 0 percent and 25 percent, respectively. Using data on 4,216 individuals and their
households in Vietnam, between 2004 and 2006, Van den Berg and Cuong (2011) study the
effect of social assistance benefits on subsequent private transfers. Vietnam’s social security
net includes many programs, including both contribution-based and non-contribution-based
transfers. The main non-contributory scheme is the National Targeted Program (NTP) and
various social allowances. In their study, Van den Berg and Cuong (2011) focus on social
allowances disbursed in cash. The study finds no evidence of crowding-out, which constitutes
the smallest effect size found among all the studies that examine the impact of social
assistance programs. Similarly, McKernan et al. (2005) find a small crowd-effect. This study,
based in Bangladesh, analyzes the impact of microcredit loans on private transfers between
1991 and 1999. The study relies on data from a panel survey on the BRAC Microcredit
9

program, which collects information on households including their income, debt, and familial
transfers. Based on this data and survey period, the study reports a crowd-out effect of 25
percent.
On the opposite end of the spectrum are the estimates from Mejía-Guevara (2015),
which finds a large crowd-out effect in response to social assistance benefits. The study relies
on data from Mexico and assesses the effects of socio-economic inequality on the reallocation
of intergenerational flows using estimates for two years, 1994 and 2004. The study shows that
the reallocation of economic resources, mainly to children and the elderly, changes
substantially, estimating a crowd-out effect of 88 percent.
In addition to documenting changes in the amount of transfers, it is important to shed
light on whether program benefits induce any change (regardless of how large or small) on the
probability of receiving transfers (the extensive margin). Table 1 also reports these effects
(column (8) reports the extensive margin in response to income changes; column (10) reports
the extensive margin in response to a change in program participation). Such estimates can
illuminate whether the introduction of program benefits can influence the family structure of
transfers within interfamilial networks. The estimates of the effect on the extensive margin
range from 0.001 to -0.49, with a median of -0.03. These estimates indicate that, for those
households and individuals who receive social assistance benefits, the change in the
probability of receiving a future private transfer is higher than for those individuals who are
not affected by the specific policy intervention.
B.

Social Security and Pension Programs
In contrast to the studies that examine the effect of social assistance, studies that

examine the influence of social security and pension benefits rely on a specific, single, policy
intervention. In this group, we include social insurance programs for age-based events
(excluding means-tested programs). An important point to underscore is that the majority of
programs in this category have been implemented in upper-middle-income settings. This
feature may be unsurprising as, in general, a country’s demographic transitions toward old age
in later stages of economic development (Sudharsanan and Bloom 2018), a phenomenon that
coincides with enhanced fiscal capacity systems capable of supporting large-scale retirement
programs. In the past three years alone, several studies have been published that focus on the
relationship between public and private transfers in China (Cheng et al. 2016, Chen et al.
10

2017, and Nikolov and Adelman 2019), all of which use specific pension schemes as a natural
policy experiment.
Table 2 summarizes the studies that examine the impact of pension benefits on
intergenerational family transfers. The majority of studies in this category rely on differencein-differences study design (DD or DDD), whereby some regions that adopt pension benefits
serve as a treatment group and are compared to plausible control regions that do not adopt the
program. Pension programs are often implemented by staggered rollouts, providing a natural
lane to classify geographic areas into treatment and control groups. Additionally, pension
eligibility requirements generally rely on an age threshold, which can serve as another
potential source of exogenous variation in either DDD designs or regression discontinuity
designs (RDD).
[Table 2 about here]

In this category, fewer studies report evidence of a crowd-out effect: 5 out of 14
studies that report estimates either find little to no evidence of crowding-out or report
imprecisely estimated zeros. However, a few studies in this category (e.g., Gibson et al. 2001,
Juarez 2009, and Cox, Eser, and Jimenez 1998) also report sizable estimates of crowding-out.
Overall, the median estimate of crowding-out across all studies in this group is 27 percent.
The lowest crowd-out effect has been estimated in the context of pension programs in
China, where the government has adopted a national rural pension scheme. Two studies that
examine the crowd-out effect in accordance with this program are Nikolov and Adelman
(2019) and Cheng et al. (2016).19 Nikolov and Adelman (2019) exploit a staggered rollout of
China’s New Rural Pension Scheme (NRPS) and use data from 2009 to 2013 based on the
China Health and Retirement Survey. The study implements a triple difference approach,
based on the staggered implementation of the pension policy across the country, and examines
the effect of the retirement program on the incidence and the amount of inter vivos transfers
sent to beneficiaries of the public program. To estimate the effect of the public program, the

19
Chen et al. (2017) and Galiani, Gertler and Bando (2014) also find negligible crowding-out. Chen et al. (2017) uses parametric and semiparametric analyses to estimate crowding-out over quartiles of pension receipts. They find minor crowding-out at the lowest and highest
quartiles but crowding-in at the second and third—concluding that, overall, there had been a crowding-in of private transfers resulting from a
Chinese urban contributory pension program. Additionally, Galiani, Gertler, and Bando (2014) uniquely analyze crowding-out resulting from
the non-contributory universal pension scheme “Assistance for Older Rural Adults Program” in Mexico. The authors use a two-period, twogood utility model to capture the effects of pension receipt on individual consumption and labor supply. They demonstrate that, for those in
the treatment group, the reduction of income (due to increased leisure) and concurrent increase of consumption account for almost the entire
public pension amount. Thus, using this logic, they argue that private transfers among the treated remained unchanged, indicating no crowdingout.
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study uses variation across communities, which adopt the pension program between 2009 and
2013. The focus of the study is the DDD estimator. It captures the average program effect on
private transfers for individuals who are 60 years of age or older and who live in a community
that implemented the pension program versus individuals who are 60 years of age or older but
live in a community that did not adopt the program. The study finds that the receipt of pension
benefits reduces the likelihood that beneficiaries receive inter vivos transfers from their
children. However, the estimated reduction is quantitatively small. Although the overall
findings of the results estimated in Nikolov and Adelman (2019) are consistent with previous
empirical studies, the study finds a considerably smaller effect size than other studies that use
data from developing countries. Similarly, Cheng et al. (2016) examine the effect of the same
pension program but its focus is on various forms of private transfers and finds the same
qualitative effect of the program as Nikolov and Adelman (2019).20 Using a DD design, the
study exploits the staggered rollout and finds no evidence of a crowd-out effect in the context
of the program.
However, some studies in this group do find evidence of large crowding-out. Chuang
(2012) uses data from Taiwan and reports the category’s largest crowd-out effect of almost 92
percent in response to an old-age farmer’s allowance.21 Juarez (2009) estimates the effect of
an arguably exogenous increase of annual income, a demogrant for individuals 70 years or
older and residing in Mexico City, on the average amount of private transfers provided to the
elderly. The transfer amount from the program was approximately 60 U.S. dollars per month
and represented, on average, 30 percent of the monthly income of individuals who qualified
for the benefit. The monetary benefit was not subject to taxes and was solely conditioned on
age. The study uses data from the Mexican Income and Expenditure Survey, called ENIGH,
between 1996 and 2004. Using a two-stage least squares estimation coupled with a Tobit
method adjustment, the study estimates the impact of program benefits on two types of
transfers: domestic transfers received from within Mexico and transfers received from abroad.
The estimated crowd-out effect in Juarez (2009) is 86 percent.
In Table 2, we report the estimated effects of public pension receipt on the incidence
of future transfers (column (8) reports the extensive margin in response to income changes

20

Adelman and Nikolov (2018) use a sample of 11,717 individuals who face a defined-contribution, while Cheng, Liu, Zhang and Zhao (2016)
use a much smaller sample of 412 individuals who participate in the NRPS under a non-contributory stipulation.
21
The Old-Age Farmers’ Welfare Allowance was implemented in 1995 by the Taiwanese government to improve the life quality of geriatric
farmers. The purpose is to provide financial support to those elderly farmers who are genuinely financially disadvantaged.
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while column (10) reports the extensive margin in response to a change in program
participation). The range of estimates varies from a 61 percent decrease (Juarez 2009) to a 20
percent increase (Kang 2004). Kang (2004) uses household data from Nepal encompassing
the years 1995 to 1996 and is the only study to both find no evidence of crowding-out and
document the opposite phenomenon of crowding-in. The study shows that public transfers
lead to crowding-in of private transfers, on the extensive margin, by as much as 21 percent.
Although the authors do not provide an in-depth explanation of this result, they offer two
plausible explanations for the anomaly. They point to the fact that public transfers are not
widespread in Nepal (in comparison to other low-income countries) as a likely driver of the
estimated effect size. Additionally, they explain that the average amount of private transfers is
likely too small to be displaced by public income benefits.
C.

Other Insurance Type Programs
The final category comprises studies that examine the effects of other insurance-

related interventions, such as health insurance or unemployment insurance, excluding any
social security or pension-related programs.22 Table 3 reports the empirical estimates from
studies whose analysis focuses on intergenerational responses to formal or informal insurance
schemes.23
[Table 3 about here]
Most notably, almost all studies document evidence of crowding-out in response to
these programs. In fact, out of the three types of social protection programs for which we
synthesize results, insurance programs exhibit the largest for crowding-out. With that said, the
estimates range from 8 percent in Ghana (Strupat and Klohn 2018) to 91 percent in the
Philippines (Cox and Jimenez 1995), with a median of 21 percent.24

22

Insurance, in this case, is defined to encompass a range of formal and informal networks that provide individuals and households with relief
from a money-demanding emergency—e.g., a natural disaster or health complication.
23
We include findings from four experimental studies, which specifically examine crowding-out in the context of informal insurance markets
and developing countries. Landmann, Vollan, and Frölich (2012), the earliest and most cited of the four studies, bases the experiment on a
solidarity game procedure and subsequently utilizes a Tobit model to test for crowding-out. Lin, Liu, and Meng (2014) implement a theoretic
altruism model and a dictator game to test for crowding-out among a sample of individuals in China. Cecchi, Duchoslav, and Bulte (2016) also
run a lab in-the-field experiment distinctly based on a public goods game. They exploit a health micro-insurance project implemented in Uganda
to identify participants who had access to the insurance. Lastly, Lenel and Steiner (2017) gather a sample of individuals from Cambodia and
implement a “transfer” game that borrows aspects from both solidarity and dictator games. The results from these lab experiments bolster the
base of empirical evidence documenting sizeable crowd-out effects.
24
Hasegawa (2017) examines the effects of national health insurance rollouts in Vietnam on informal support and various risk-coping measures,
such as the sale of assets. The study is the only one that does not find support for crowding-out but its observational study design is ill-equipped
to detect causal effects.
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Strupat and Klohn (2018) investigate the relationship between informal transfer
networks and formal health insurance in Ghana, an ideal setting because of the important role
informal family support plays in the country. The study design relies on a comparison
between districts with and without access to the National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS),
which launched in 2003. Specifically, the study uses data on the implementation of the health
insurance program for the period between 1998 and 2006. The primary source for data on the
informal transfers is the Ghanaian Living Standard Household Survey, which covers 90
districts within the country. Using a difference-in-differences design, Strupat and Klohn
(2018) find that the introduction of the formal health insurance scheme resulted in non-trivial
crowd-out effects of informal transfers. Their estimated effect-size for the displacement of
received private transfers is approximately 8 percent.25 Interestingly, they also estimate the
displacement effect for transfers given, finding a larger effect-size of approximately 20
percent. One explanation the authors give for this discrepancy is asymmetric information
between donors and recipients—recipients that are covered by the insurance may still receive
transfers from districts where the NHIS is not yet available.
The largest crowd-out estimate in response to a formal insurance program in a
developing country comes from Cox and Jimenez (1995). Cox and Jimenez (1995) use data
from the 1988 Family Income and Expenditure Survey in the Philippines. The main
components of the social program in the Philippines comprises food subsidies, public works
subsidies, and livelihood creation programs. The study not only attempts to estimate the
causal effects of the Philippines’ insurance program but is also methodologically unique
because it attempts to estimate any possible nonlinear effects of public income benefits on
private transfers by modeling individual income based on a spline function. The main feature
of the spline specification approach is an income parameter that is allowed to vary over
different levels of income. In particular, the study fixes the spline nodes at quartiles based on
pre-transfer income. Using these parameter estimates, the study estimates the displacement
effect of unemployment insurance on private transfers received to be 91 percent for a sample
of unemployed urban males.
Table 3 also reports estimates on the direct effect of the introduction of other
insurance programs on the incidence of subsequent private transfers (column (8) reports the
25

Another study that reports a crowd-out estimate that is among the lowest for insurance programs is Lin et al. (2014). The study, based on a
lab experimental design, includes a series of within-subject dictator games to measure individual altruism. The study’s empirical estimate of
crowding-out is approximately 20 percent.
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change in the likelihood of a positive transfer in response to income benefits; column (10)
reports the change in the likelihood of a positive transfer in response to program
participation). The table’s estimates range from -0.055 in Mexico, found in Orraca-Romano
(2015), to a marginal effect of -0.12 in Ghana, reported in Strupat and Klohn (2018). The
median estimate is -0.09, which implies a relatively sizable effect on the extensive margin
within this category.

III.

Comparison by Social Protection Type and Geography
We next examine how the intergenerational response for private transfers differs by

type of social protection and geographic area.
A.

Does the Type of Social Protection Matter?
Together, Tables 1, 2, and 3 indicate that the largest crowding-out occurs in response

to social assistance programs, among which the median crowd-out effect is approximately 46
percent. Despite ubiquitous evidence of crowding-out associated with social assistance
programs, there is no ostensible pattern of variation of the effect size magnitude by country
income classification.
Although the category of other insurance programs does not exhibit the highest
median estimate for the total crowd-out effect, almost all of the studies we include in the
category of other insurance programs report a moderate crowding-out effect. Studies
conducted in Cambodia (Lenel and Steiner 2017), Ghana (Strupat and Klohn 2018), China
(Lin et al. 2014), and Mexico (Orraca-Romano 2015) all, remarkably, fall within the crowdout range of 20 to 30 percent. Although there is little variation in the country income
classification for this group of social protection, the empirical effect-size of crowding-out
appears to be larger in low-income countries (Philippines and Cambodia) than in middleincome countries (China and Mexico), at least in the small set of studies that we synthesize.
Crowding-out within the social security and pension benefits category, i.e., programs
targeting the elderly, exhibits more heterogeneity. Five out of the fourteen studies that report
results, indicate either very small crowding or imprecisely estimated zero impacts on private
transfers. However, some studies in this category report a considerable crowding out (e.g., 92
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percent reported in Chuang et al. 2016, and 86 percent reported in Juarez 2009). The overall
median empirical estimate of crowding-out for private transfers is only 27 percent.
Regarding the overall pattern of the estimated effect-size on the incidence of
subsequent intergenerational transfers: generally, other insurance programs lead to a higher
(as compared to social assistance programs and pension programs) decrease of the incidence
of future transfers; the effect size of the extensive margin associated with social assistance
programs is the lowest.
B.

Geographic Areas and Crowding Out
We also examine for patterns across broad geographic areas using the full crowd-out

effect and its extensive component. The empirical crowd-out effect is largest in Latin America
(for social assistance programs), East Asia and Latin America (for social security and pension
programs), and South East Asia (for other insurance programs); the lowest effect size
estimates vary by program type and there is no evidence of a consistent geographic pattern.
The largest drop in the incidence of subsequent intergenerational transfers is in Latin
America. We see this across two separate categories, social assistance programs (Albarran
and Attanasio 2003), and social security and pension programs (Juarez 2009). Overall, Latin
America consistently seems to exhibit the largest behavioral response across both margins.

IV.

Is There Evidence of Heterogeneous Effects?
In extrapolating results from the studies we review, it is important to keep in mind that

people may respond differently to the same policy intervention—a possibility that researchers
refer to as “treatment heterogeneity.” Uncovering differences in the behavioral response by
specific demographic factors can be informative for policy-targeting and improving the design
of existing programs.
In Tables 4, 5, and 6, we report and re-examine the behavioral response to social
protection, extracting information from studies that implement heterogeneous subsample
analysis. We report the heterogeneous treatment effects for social assistance, social security
and pension programs, and social insurance programs, respectively. We follow the same style
as in the main tables: we report the full crowd-out effect and the extensive margin component
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in response to either income benefits (columns 8-9) or in response to program participation
(columns 10-11). In general, the subsample analyses we synthesize report these effects by
three main characteristics: income, gender, and urbanicity.
[Table 4 about here]
Table 4 reports the heterogeneity of impacts for the social assistance programs. The
one study that provides results disaggregated by gender is McKernan et al. (2005) in
Bangladesh. The pattern shows that if the recipient is male, the crowd-out effect is larger than
the effect associated with a female recipient. In Taiwan, Gerardi and Tsai (2014) investigate
heterogeneous effects across individual characteristics. In particular, looking at the
educational attainment status for both recipient and sender: higher educational attainment
appears to exhibit a protective effect on the extensive margin.
In Table 5, we report program effects elicited by social security and pension benefits.
The studies in South Africa (Jensen 2003) and Mexico (Amuedo-Dorantes and Juarez 2015)
demonstrate a clear and consistent gender-based pattern for the crowd-out effect. However,
this pattern is reversed to the one found in Juarez (2009) and McKernan et al. (2005). In
Jensen (2003) and Amuedo-Dorantes and Juarez (2015), if the recipient is female, the crowdout effect is larger than if the recipient is male. Interestingly, in Mexico (Juarez 2009), the
study reports results that illuminate the interplay between gender and poverty status: the
crowd-out for a recipient who is female and very poor is considerably larger than the crowdout for a recipient who is female and non-poor. Only one study, Nikolov and Adelman (2019),
disaggregates estimates of the crowd-out effect by poverty status: the results show that the
crowd-out effect is larger for poor versus non-poor households.
[Table 5 about here]
Only a handful of studies disaggregate their estimates for subsamples in response to
other social insurance programs (reported in Table 6). The ones that do so provide
information on how the behavioral response differs by gender, poverty status, and urbanicity.
The full crowd-out effect is larger for females (than for males) and for individuals living in
rural areas than individuals living in urban areas. Regarding the effect on the incidence of
transfers, the incidence drops more sharply among low-income individuals or individuals
residing in rural areas.
[Table 6 about here]
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V.

Concluding Lessons on Intergenerational Transfers
In this paper, we review the empirical evidence from studies that examine the

behavioral response of private transfers to public program benefits in the context of
developing countries. We synthesize information about program design and impact, reporting
several findings based on the collective evidence from our refined sample of studies. It is
overwhelmingly clear that public and private transfers often do interact in the context of
developing countries. However, much remains to be learned about the patterns illuminated in
this study and the mechanisms that support them.
In light of the evidence presented here, it is important to consider how new social
protection programs will influence existing informal transfer networks between, and within,
private households. In particular, the growing demographic of elderly individuals, a group that
already faces a disproportionate level of poverty in many developing countries, will
increasingly be a target of these programs. Therefore, it is important to pay close attention to
program efficiency, especially in the context of undesirable behavioral responses. If social
protection programs displace already existing private familial transfers, this could result in
ineffective redistribution and unattainable poverty objectives – exactly what social protection
aims to accomplish.
Because social protection programs generate displacement of private transfers,
policymakers need to factor in the magnitude of this behavioral response. The robust evidence
of crowding-out we find across a diverse array identification strategies demonstrates that, in
developing countries, many private transfers are underpinned by altruism. In particular, we
review studies that employ difference-in-differences, triple difference, two-stage, and threestage least squares experimental designs. All of these identification approaches have produced
estimates that point to a non-negligible presence of a crowd-out effect. Several lab
experiments26 also examine the impact of formal insurance on informal markets and report
estimates consistent with the observational study designs. Of the 29 studies that explicitly
tested for a crowd-out effect, 23 found an effect, while none except for Kang (2004) found
crowding-in.

26

Landmann, Vollan and Frölich (2012) implement a solidarity game while Lin, Liu and Meng (2014) use a dictator game, both find particularly
high magnitudes of crowding-out, 62 and 42 percent, respectively. The sizeable and consistent measures of crowding-out as well as the
corresponding likelihood estimates all point toward the notion that altruism is ubiquitous, particularly in the domain of private transfers to the
elderly.
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We document stark heterogeneity of the estimates by important demographic
characteristics, such as gender and poverty status. Two studies that provide disaggregated
results by gender, one in Bangladesh (McKernan et al. 2005) and the other in Mexico (Juarez
2009), report results that appear to be consistent. The pattern shows that if the recipient is
male, the crowd-out effect is larger than if the recipient is female. Interestingly, in Mexico
(Juarez 2009), the study reports results that illuminate the interplay between gender and
poverty status: the crowd-out for a recipient who is female and very poor is considerably
larger than the crowd-out for a recipient who is female and non-poor. Other studies that
specifically focus on gender, such as Jensen (2003) and Amuedo-Dorantes and Juarez (2015),
also exhibit a clear pattern for the crowd-out; however, the pattern is reversed to the one
found in McKernan et al. (2005) and Juarez (2009). Only one study (i.e., Nikolov and
Adelman 2019) disaggregates estimates of the crowd-out effect by poverty status: the results
show that the crowd-out effect is larger for poor versus non-poor households.
The two aspects of the crowd-out effect, the extensive (the probability of receiving
any positive private transfers) and the intensive margin (the amount of private transfers
received by those who receive positive transfers), reinforce each other. This reinforcing nature
of the two aspects of crowding out may be of use to researchers who are constrained by data
limitations—it may not be out of the question, for example, to assume the existence of
crowding-out if one finds a strong decrease in the probability of receiving private transfers
along with other indications. Aguila, Kapteyn, Robles, and Weidmer (2010) find a decrease in
the probability of receiving private transfers along with a lower proportion of sampled
individuals who report their relatives paying their out-of-pocket health expenses. As a result,
the authors consider crowding-out a distinct possibility without a direct test.
In specific circumstances, crowding-in could occur (especially if the recipient is of
low-income status and the existing pre-program private transfers are negligible). Kang (2004)
uses household data from Nepal and is the only study that demonstrates, in the context of a
low-income country, that public transfers can lead to the crowding-in of private transfers by
almost as much as 21 percent. In other words, it shows that public benefits lead to the
strengthening of the family relationship. A possible explanation of this crowding-in effect is
that public transfers are not widespread in Nepal (in comparison to other low-income
countries) and that the average amount of private transfers are too small to be displaced by
public income benefits. Perhaps the existence of this effect points to less altruism among
19

private, informal transfer networks of rural low-income households, but given that this is the
only study demonstrating a crowd-in effect, some caution in interpreting the result is
necessary.
Our interpretation of the accumulating evidence is that, while robust evidence exists
that social protection programs could result in non-trivial displacements of already existing
private support systems, there are a number of important caveats related to the type of public
program, country-setting, and characteristics of the recipient and their extended support
network. We document consistently large crowd-out effects in response to all social
protection types. Furthermore, gender and the income level of safety-net recipients can
interact in important ways with the willingness of family networks to provide transfers. In
sum, the relative merit of introducing various safety net benefits and the potential leakage,
disincentive costs to the program recipients, and displacement effects among inter vivos
transfers should be compared in choosing an appropriate program.
Moving forward, future research should focus on understanding the role of various
mechanisms mediating the magnitude of crowding-out. Factors such as the demographics of
the country, living standards, the type of risk, and the strength of family networks likely play
an important role in influencing the magnitude of the behavioral response. Expanding the
evidence-base with additional research on the role of each of these factors is paramount. More
broadly, our findings suggest that efforts to account for the displacement of private transfers is
likely to be crucial for achieving the long-term objectives of effective public policy.
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Tables
Table 1: Intergenerational Transfers, Social Assistance Programs
Study

Country

WB
Class

Study
Sample
Size

Estimation
Strategy

Policy Intervention

Baseline Mean
Dependent
Variable

Extensive Effect

(

(1)
McKernan et al.
(2005)cg *WP*

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Bangladesh

2

1,800

IV - MLE

Van den Berg and
Cuong (2011)c

Vietnam

2

4,216

OLS
Tobit

Attanasio and RiosRull (2000)

Mexico

3

23,306

Probit
Tobit

Albarran and
Attanasio (2003)

Mexico

3

23,247

Probit
Tobit

f

Logit
Tobit

Kang and Sawada
(2003)c

South Korea

3

Logit:
2,867
Tobit:
9,915

Oruc (2011)

Bosnia

3

2,790

Probit
OLS

Mexico

3

103,241

n/a

Thailand

3

5,650

Probit
Tobit

Taiwan

4

5,032

IV - Probit
IV - Tobit

Mejía-Guevara
(2015)
Kananurak and
Sirisankanan
(2017)c
Gerardi and Tsai
(2014)ij

(6)
Microcredit programs: Grameen,
BRAC, BRDB
Vietnam's "Growth and Equity"
strategy (Poverty reduction
policy)
Progresa: Conditional-cash
transfer (CCT) program
targeting low-income rural
individuals
Progresa: Conditional-cash
transfer (CCT) program
targeting low-income rural
individuals
Public transfers
Social transfers following the
Bosnian War
Transfers from multiple antipoverty public polices

(7)
6,074
(Taka)

> 0)

Total Effect

Extensive
Effect:
Program
∆

∗ ( |

(8)

( > 0)
∆
∗ ( | > 0)

> 0)

(9)

Total Effect:
Program
∆
∆

(10)

(11)

36.18
(Pesos)e

-0.052*

-0.22ab

n/a

-0.4965***

-0.25a

716.3
(VN$ ’000)

0

133
(Won '000)

–0.009***

33.74
(KM)

0.001***

-0.481***

-0.88abh

n/a

Public welfare transfers to
agricultural households

15,848.87
(Baht)

Senior Citizens Welfare Living
Allowance (age-based
eligibility)

4.793
(NT$ '000)

-7.46E-06

-0.457***

-0.37**

-0.66

Notes: All transfers for the dependent variable are on a monthly basis and provided at the household level (unless noted otherwise). The World Bank classification is from
https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/378834-how-does-the-world-bank-classify-countries (June 2017). The classification is: 1 = low income, 2 = lower middle income, 3 = upper middle income, 4 = high
income. The sample size is the number of observations in the estimation sample. Bolded estimation strategy denotes coefficients are from its result. All coefficients represent the effect of social protection on private transfers
received (unless otherwise specified). The total effect measures the dollar-for-dollar crowd-out of private by public transfers. The program induced total effect represents the proportion of private transfers crowded-out from the
introduction of public transfers, denominators vary across studies. Columns (8) and (9) report the response of private transfers to an income change (of program benefits); Columns (10) and (11) report the response of private
transfers to a change in program participation. Zero crowd-out effect specified if the author explicitly reports no crowding-out. When studies implement maximum likelihood estimation, the reported estimates are assumed to be
marginal effects. (a) Standard errors were not estimated in source study to determine significance levels of effect size estimates. (b) Effect size calculated from estimates in the source study. (c) Transfers measured on an annual
basis. (d) Period of transfers not indicated in source study. (e) Baseline mean based on the control group. (f) Country classification at the time of the study. (g) Based on the female sample. (h) Change in private transfers over public
transfers between 2004 and 1994 as a percent of total consumption. (i) Coefficients represent the effect on transfers given. (j) Observations at individual-level.
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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Table 2: Intergenerational Transfers, Social Security and Pension Programs
Study

Country

WB
Class

Study
Sample
Size

Estimation
Strategy

Baseline
Mean
Dependent
Variable

Policy Intervention

Extensive Effect

(

(1)
Kang
(2004)d
Cox and
Jimenez
(1995)d
Gibson et al.
(2011)k
Cox, Eser,
and Jimenez
(1998)d
Jensen
(2003)
Maitra and
Ray (2003)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Nepal

1

3,120

Probit
Tobit

Pension Benefit Scheme

568.80
(Rs)

Philippines

2

175

OLS

Social Security to urban
households

7,585.55
(Pesos)

(9)

Probit
Tobit

Social Security Payments

78
(Intis)

-0.421***

815

DDD - OLS

Old-Age Pension Income

201
(Rand)g

8,398

IV - OLS

1,060

Peru

3

Probit:
1,387
Tobit: 182

3
3

3

9,321

Mexico

3

19,298

DDD - OLS

China

3

412

IV - OLS

Galiani et
al. (2016)

Mexico

3

1,417

DD

Cox and
Jimenez
(1992)

Peru

3

Probit:
1,121
Tobit: 175

Probit
Tobit

Old-Age Pension Program

197.24
(Pesos)

∆

(10)

(11)

0.206

1.83ab

-0.552***

0

-0.609

-0.86***

254
(Pesos)g
1,944.3
(Yuan)

∆

-0.30a

n/a

Nutrition Transfer for Senior
Adults
Monthly payments (in Mexico
City)
“70 y Mas” (70 and Above)
Program
(Until 2011 non-contributory,
non means-tested; rural areas)
New Rural Pension Scheme
(Pension benefits)
Adultos Mayores Program
(Older Adults Program). Noncontributory, age 70, village with
at most 2,500 inhabitants
Peru's contributory social
security program (IPSS):
Mandatory for formal sector
employees

Total Effect:
Program Induced

-0.27a

Retirement income

2

Mexico

AmuedoDorantes
and Juarez
(2015)fh
Cheng et al.
(2016)f

(8)

( > 0)
∆
∗ ( | > 0)

> 0)

OLS: -0.755
IV: -0.758
Spline: 0.649

OLS
OLS – IV
OLS - Spline

Tobit
IV - Tobit

Juarez
(2009)

(7)

∆
∗ ( |

10.024
(Kina)

Papua New
Guinea

South
Africa
South
Africa

(6)

> 0)

Extensive
Effect:
Program

Total Effect

-0.066**

-0.37a

0

0

77.70
(Intis)

-0.565***

-0.16a

Continued
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Table 2 (Continued): Intergenerational Transfers, Social Security and Pension Programs
Study

Country

WB
Class

Study
Sample Size

Estimation
Strategy

Baseline Mean
Dependent
Variable

Policy Intervention

Extensive Effect

(

> 0)

∆
∗ ( |

( > 0)
∆
∗ ( | > 0)

> 0)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

Chen et al.
(2017)cef

China

3

Logistic:
4,929
Tobit:1,591

Logistic
Tobit

Urban contributory pension
(Eligibility at age 60 and
residence in an urban area)

2,812.83
(Yuan)

-0.054***

0.010*m

Retirement income

292.978
(Yuan)

Gibson et al.
(2011)j
Adelman
and Nikolov
(2019)cf
Lai and
Orsuwan
(2009)d

Chuang
(2012)cl

China

3

1,103

China

3

11,562

Taiwan

4

(T1): 14,861
(T2): 25,340

Taiwan

4

13,681

OLS
OLS – IV
OLS Spline
DD
IV - Tobit
IV - OLS
DD
OLS

Crowd-out
ratio

New Rural Pension
Scheme (Pension benefits)

4,242.60
(Yuan)
T1: 55,986.0
T2: 44,159.4
(NT$)i

Old Age Allowance
Farmer Allowance (OAFA).
Eligible for elderly farmers
already enrolled in farmer
insurance
Old Age Allowance (OAA).
Created in 1994, means-tested
scheme, replaced in 2008

Extensive
Effect:
Program

Total Effect

(10)

Total Effect:
Program
Induced
∆
∆

(11)

OLS: 0.001
IV: 0.001
Spline:
-0.041
-0.067

-0.084
T1: -0.29a
T2: -0.54a

OAFA: -0.92a
OAA: -0.87a

Notes: All transfers for the dependent variable are on a monthly basis and provided at the household level (unless noted otherwise). The World Bank classification is from
https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/378834-how-does-the-world-bank-classify-countries (June 2017). The classification is: 1 = low income, 2 = lower middle income, 3 = upper middle income, 4 =
high income. The sample size is the number of observations in the estimation sample. Bolded estimation strategy denotes coefficients are from its result. All coefficients represent the effect of social protection on private
transfers received (unless otherwise specified. The total effect measures the dollar-for-dollar crowd-out of private by public transfers. The program induced total effect represents the proportion of private transfers
crowded-out from the introduction of public transfers, denominators vary across studies. Columns (8) and (9) report the response of private transfers to an income change (of program benefits); Columns (10) and (11)
report the response of private transfers to a change in program participation. Zero crowd-out effect specified if the author explicitly reports no crowding-out. When studies implement maximum likelihood estimation, the
reported estimates are assumed to be marginal effects. (a) Standard errors were not estimated in source study to determine significance levels of effect size estimates. (b) Effect size calculated from estimates in the source
study. (c) Transfers measured on an annual basis. (d) Period of transfers not indicated in source study. (e) Use semi-parametric and non-parametric for empirical estimation and identification. (f) Observations at individuallevel. (g) Baseline mean based on the control group. (h) In Amuedo-Dorantes and Juarez (2015), the dependent variable is logged monthly private transfers; the independent variable is 1 if a “treated locality” and 0
otherwise. The reported coefficient represents the percent average difference in monthly private transfers received between an individual impacted and not impacted by the “70 y mas” program. (i) Mean from treatment
groups (respectively T1 and T2 in the study). Treatment group T1 comprises very low-income elderly individuals and T2 comprises very-low-income and low-income elderly individuals. (j) Rural sample. (k) Urban
sample. (l) In the Chuang (2012) study, effects are measured for two programs: old age allowance (OAA), and old age farmer allowance (OAFA). (m) Log-linear specification; represents a 1 percent increase in transfers in
response to 1,000 yuan.
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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Table 3: Intergenerational Transfers, Other Insurance Programs
Study

Country

WB
Class

Study
Sample
Size

Estimation
Strategy

Policy Intervention

Baseline
Mean
Dependent
Variable

Extensive
Effect
(

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

∆

2.89
(Tokens)i

7,585.55
(Pesos)

-0.91a

n/a

0

2,155
(Riel)i

-0.28ag

1

409

Probit
OLS

Cox and
Jimenez
(1995)j

Philippines

2

175

OLS

Unemployment Insurance to
urban households

Vietnam

2

8,548

MultinomialLogistic
IV

Cambodia

2

1,320

OLS

Strupat and
Klohn
(2018)ced

Ghana

2

11,731
4,277

LPM - OLS
OLS

Strupat and
Klohn
(2018)cd

Ghana

2

11,331
2,988

LPM - OLS
OLS

Universal Healthcare Goal.
Health Insurance enacted 2008,
aimed for universal coverage by
2014
Field-in-the-lab Experiment.
Test the crowd-out of informal
insurance support; experiment
uses dictator and solidarity
games
National Health Insurance
Scheme. Voluntary for the
informal sector, mandatory for
formal sector
National Health Insurance
Scheme. Voluntary for the
informal sector, mandatory for
formal sector

(9)

∆

(7)

Uganda

(8)

( > 0)
∆
∗ ( | > 0)

> 0)

(6)

Cecchi et
al. (2016)d

Lenel and
Steiner
(2017)d
*WP*

∆
∗ ( |

Total Effect:
Program
Induced

(5)

NGO's Health Micro-insurance
Project. Members receive an
insurance card to be used for
services provided by contracted
facilities

Hasegawa
(2017)

> 0)

Extensive
Effect:
Program

Total Effect

(10)

(11)

-0.093**

-0.10abk

71.76
(GHC)

-0.12*

-0.20a

56.07
(GHC)

-0.09

-0.08a

Continued
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Table 3 (Continued): Intergenerational Transfers, Other Insurance Programs
Study

Country

WB
Class

Study
Sample
Size

Estimation
Strategy

Policy Intervention

Baseline Mean
Dependent
Variable

Extensive Effect

(

(1)
Lin et al.
(2014)d

OrracaRomano
(2015)

(2)
China

Mexico

(3)
3

3

(4)

(5)

1,000

DD
OLS

54,854

LPM - OLS
OLS

(6)

(7)

Lab Experiment. Experimentally
tests the effect of formal insurance
provision on informal risk-sharing
using repeated risk-sharing game

Seguro Popular. Health insurance
free to families located at the bottom
four deciles of the income
distribution

> 0)

Extensive
Effect:
Program

Total Effect

∆
∗ ( |

(8)

( > 0)
∆
∗ ( | > 0)

> 0)

(9)

(10)

64.2
(Experimental
Currency)i

387.9
(Pesos)

Total Effect:
Program
Induced
∆
∆

(11)
-0.21***f

-0.0555*

-0.23a

Notes: All transfers for the dependent variable are on a monthly basis and provided at the household level (unless noted otherwise). The World Bank classification is from https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/378834how-does-the-world-bank-classify-countries (June 2017). The classification is: 1 = low income, 2 = lower middle income, 3 = upper middle income, 4 = high income. Sample size reported is the number of observations used in the estimation
sample. All coefficients represent the effect of social protection on private transfers received (unless otherwise specified). The total effect measures the dollar-for-dollar crowd-out of private by public transfers. The program induced total
effect represents the proportion of private transfers crowded-out from the introduction of public transfers, denominators vary across studies. Columns (8) and (9) report the response of private transfers to an income change (of program
benefits); Columns (10) and (11) report the response of private transfers to a change in program participation. Zero crowd-out effect specified if the author explicitly reports no crowding-out. When studies implement maximum likelihood
estimation, the reported estimates are assumed to be marginal effects. (a) Standard errors are not estimated in source study to determine significance levels of effect size estimates. (b) Effect size calculated from estimates in the source
study. (c) Transfers measured on an annual basis. (d) Analysis for this study was performed at the individual-level. (e) Coefficients represent the effect on transfers given. (f) For Lin et al. (2014): participants offered 21% less in transfers
as a proportion of the baseline mean transfer when the option to insure was offered. (g) The reported crowd-out in the Lenel and Steiner (2017) study means that participants transferred 28% less as a proportion of the mean baseline transfer
to those participants who were given the option to insure but declined. (h) Urban households only. (i) Baseline mean based on the control group. (j) Period of transfers not indicated in source study. (k) In Cecchi et al. (2016), participants
with access to insurance transferred 10% less in tokens as a proportion of the mean amount transferred by the control group. For Strupat and Klohn (2018)’s specifications, the first uses transfers given as a dependent variable and the second
uses transfers received.
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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Table 4: Heterogeneous Treatment Analysis of Intergenerational Transfers. Social Assistance Programs
Study

Country

WB
Class

Sample
Size

Estimation
Strategy

Policy
Intervention

Baseline
Mean

Extensive
Effect
(

> 0)

∗ ( |

(1)
McKern
an et al.
(2005)c
*WP*

(2)
Bangladesh

(3)
2

Oruc
(2011)

Bosnia

3

MejíaGuevara
(2015)

Mexico

3

Oruc
(2011)

(4)
1,800

2,790

IV
MLE

6,074
(Taka)

-0.25a

Female

10,061
(Taka)

-0.30a

Male

33.749
(KM)

-0.499

Poor

-0.324

Non-poor

Probit
OLS

Social transfers
following the
Bosnian War
Transfers from
multiple antipoverty public
polices

Social transfers
following the
Bosnian War

33.749
(KM)

(9)

(10)

∆

(7)

n/a

2,790

> 0)

∆

(6)

9,933

3

( > 0)
∆
∗ ( | > 0)

Subgroup

Microcredit
programs:
Grameen,
BRAC, BRDB

36,879

Bosnia

∆

Total Effect:
Program
Induced

(5)

Probit
OLS

(8)

Extensive
Effect:
Program

Total Effect

(11)

(12)

0.79abe

0 – 5 years of education

-2.54abe

16 or more years of education

-0.123

1st income decile

-0.355

2nd income decile

0.192

3rd income decile

-0.422

4th income decile

0.115

5th income decile

-0.354

6th income decile

-0.87

7th income decile

-0.38

8th income decile

-0.566

9th income decile

-0.463

10th income decile

Notes: All transfers for the dependent variable are on a monthly basis and provided at the household level (unless noted otherwise). WB class is based on the World Bank list of economies (June 2017) 1 = low income, 2 = lower middle
income, 3 = upper middle income, 4 = high income. Sample size conveys the number of observations used in estimation. Bolded estimation strategy denotes coefficients are from its result. Baseline mean represents the average amount
of the dependent variable (private transfers) from the full sample (unless noted otherwise). All coefficients represent the effect of social protection on private transfers received (unless otherwise specified). The total effect measures
the dollar-for-dollar crowd-out of private by public transfers. The program induced total effect represents the proportion of private transfers crowded-out from the introduction of public transfers, denominators vary across studies.
Columns (8) and (9) report the response of private transfers to an income change (of program benefits); Columns (10) and (11) report the response of private transfers to a change in program participation. Zero crowd-out effect specified
if the author explicitly reports no crowding-out. When studies implement maximum likelihood estimation, the reported estimates are assumed to be marginal effects. (a) Standard errors are not estimated in source study to determine
significance levels of effect size estimates. (b) Effect size calculated from estimates in the source study. (c) Transfers measured on an annual basis. (d) Period of transfers not indicated in source study. (e) Change in private transfers
over public transfers between 2004 and 1994 as a percent of total consumption. McKernan et al. (2005) use a split-regression; crowding-out in the male subgroup is primarily due to an increase in transfers sent whereas in the female
subgroup crowding-out is driven by a decrease in transfers received.
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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Table 5: Heterogeneous Treatment Analysis of Intergenerational Transfers. Social Security and Pension Programs
Study

Country

WB
Class

Sample
Size

Estimation
Strategy

Policy
Intervention

Baseline Mean

Extensive Effect
(

(1)
Jensen (2003)

Adelman and
Nikolov (2019)cf

AmuedoDorantes and
Juarez (2015)f

Cox et al.
(2004)

(2)
South Africa

(3)
3

(4)
815

5,200
China

3
2,948

Mexico

3

Intensive:
9,212
Extensive:
1,186
Intensive:
10,074
Extensive:
2,429

(5)

(6)

DDD - OLS

Old Age
Pension

DD
IV - Tobit
IV - OLS

DDD - OLS

8,684
Philippines

2

OLS - Spline
9,857

New Rural
Pension
Scheme

70 y Mas (70
and Above)

Retirement
income

8,429
Cox and
Jimenez (1995)d

Philippines

2

OLS
9,846

(7)

> 0)

Extensive
Effect:
Program
∆

∗ ( |

(8)

210
(Rand)g
201
(Rand)g
4,414.06
(Yuan)
4278.46
(Yuan)

Total Effect

( > 0)
∆
∗ ( | > 0)

> 0)

(9)

(10)

Total Effect:
Program
Induced

Subgroup

∆
∆

(11)

(12)

-0.26a

Male

-0.30a

Female

0.092

0.105

Non-Poor

-0.86

-0.986

Poor

-0.036

-0.29

Male

-0.104**

-0.70**

Female

254
(Pesos)g

7,724.31
(Pesos)
3,157.74
(Pesos)

-0.044*

Urban
n/a

-0.101*

Rural

5,692.71
(Pesos)

-0.033

n/a

Urban

2,660.40
(Pesos)

-0.072

n/a

Rural

Social
security

Continued
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Table 5 (Continued): Heterogeneous Treatment Analysis of Intergenerational Transfers. Social Security and Pension Programs
Study

Country

WB
Class

(1)

(2)

(3)

Sample
Size

Estimation
Strategy

Policy
Intervention

Baseline
Mean

Extensive
Effect

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

1,656
Gibson et al.
(2011)

Gibson et al.
(2011)

Vietnam

Indonesia

2

OLS
OLS – IV
OLS - Spline

Retirement
income

4,072

3.608
(VN$
millions)

3,291

0.228
(Rupiah
millions)

OLS
OLS – IV
OLS - Spline

2

Retirement
income

3,879

Juarez
(2009)

Mexico

3

10.374
(VN$
millions)

N/A

Tobit
IV - Tobit

Nutrition
Transfer for
Senior Adults

Total Effect

(9)
OLS: -0.180
IV: -0.002
Spline: -0.178
OLS: -0.115***
IV: -0.102**
Spline:
-0.117***
OLS: -0.049
IV: -0.086
Spline: -0.045

0.058
(Rupiah
millions)

OLS: -0.324***
IV: -0.346***
Spline:
-0.323***

171.76
(Peso)

-1.019***
-1.664***
-0.537***
-1.022***
-0.329***
-0.679***
-0.012***
-0.043**

Extensive Effect:
Program

Total
Effect:
Program
Induced

Subgroup

(10)

(11)

(12)

n/a

Urban

n/a

Rural

n/a

Urban

n/a

Rural

Female Recipient and Pre-Transfer
Income = 700 (pesos)
Male Recipient and Pre-Transfer
Income = 700 (pesos)
Female Recipient and Pre-Transfer
Income = 1,000 (pesos)
Male Recipient and Pre-Transfer
Income = 1,000 (pesos)
Female Recipient and Pre-Transfer
Income = 1,200 (pesos)
Male Recipient and Pre-Transfer
Income = 1,200 (pesos)
Female Recipient and Pre-Transfer
Income = 2,100 (pesos)
Male Recipient and Pre-Transfer
Income=2,100 (pesos)

Notes: All transfers for the dependent variable are on a monthly basis and provided at the household level (unless noted otherwise). WB class is based on the World Bank list of economies (June 2017) 1 = low income, 2 = lower middle income, 3 = upper middle income,
4 = high income. Sample size conveys the number of observations used in estimation. Bolded estimation strategy denotes coefficients are from its result. Baseline mean represents the average amount of the dependent variable (private transfers) from the full sample
(unless noted otherwise). All coefficients represent the effect of social protection on private transfers received (unless otherwise specified). The total effect measures the dollar-for-dollar crowd-out of private by public transfers. The program induced total effect represents
the proportion of private transfers crowded-out from the introduction of public transfers, denominators vary across studies. Columns (8) and (9) report the response of private transfers to an income change (of program benefits); Columns (10) and (11) report the response
of private transfers to a change in program participation. Zero crowd-out effect specified if the author explicitly reports no crowding-out. When studies implement maximum likelihood estimation, the reported estimates are assumed to be marginal effects. (a) Standard
errors are not estimated in source study to determine significance levels of effect size estimates. (b) Effect size calculated from estimates in the source study. (c) Transfers measured on an annual basis. (d) Period of transfers not indicated in source study. (e) Coefficients
represent the effect on transfers given. (f) Observations at individual-level. (g) Baseline mean is from the control group. (h) Dependent variable is the log of total remittances and independent is binary treatment. Jensen (2003): men receive OAP benefits at an older age
than women. Therefore, to estimate the effect of a pension increase for men, Jensen uses the same sample with a different DDD estimator. Adelman and Nikolov (2018) and Amuedo-Dorantes and Juarez (2015) use split-regressions.
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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Table 6: Heterogeneous Treatment Analysis of Intergenerational Transfers. Other Insurance Programs
Study

Country

WB
Class

Sample
Size

Estimation
Strategy

Policy Intervention

Baseline
Mean

Extensive Effect
(

> 0)

∗ ( |

(1)

OrracaRomano
(2015)

(2)

Mexico

(3)

3

(4)

n/a

(5)

OLS
LPM

4,136
Strupat and
Klohn
(2018) ced

Ghana

2

3,623

Probit
OLS

(6)

Seguro Popular

(7)

387.9
(Pesos)

71.76
(GHC)

2

3,590

( > 0)
∆
∗ ( | > 0)

> 0)

(9)

∆

(10)

(11)

(12)

-0.0892

-0.37ab

Female

-0.0506

-0.21ab

Male

-0.0444

-0.18ab

Urban

-0.0776

-0.32ab

Rural

-0.0677

-0.28ab

Low Income

-0.0457

-0.18ab

High Income

-0.0762*

-0.31ab

Low Health
Expenditure

-0.0273

-0.11ab

High Health
Expenditure
Children or
parents
Extended
family or
siblings
Nonrelatives
Children or
parents
Extended
family or
siblings
Nonrelatives

-0.182

n/a

-0.0709
Probit
OLS

National Health Insurance
Scheme. Voluntary for the
informal sector, mandatory for
formal sector

56.07
(GHC)

3,706

Subgroup

∆

-0.259

4,018
Ghana

∆

Total Effect:
Program Induced

-0.0813

National Health Insurance
Scheme. Voluntary for the
informal sector, mandatory for
formal sector

3,813

Strupat and
Klohn
(2018) cd

(8)

Extensive
Effect:
Program

Total Effect

-0.141
-0.155

n/a

Notes: All transfers for the dependent variable are on a monthly basis (unless noted otherwise) and provided at the household level (unless noted otherwise). WB class is based on the World Bank list of economies (June 2017) 1 = low income, 2 = lower middle income, 3
= upper middle income, 4 = high income. Sample size conveys the number of observations used in estimation. Bolded estimation strategy denotes coefficients are from its result. Baseline mean represents the average amount of the dependent variable (private transfers)
from the full sample unless otherwise specified. All coefficients represent the effect of social protection on private transfers received (unless otherwise specified). The total effect measures the dollar-for-dollar crowd-out of private by public transfers. The program
induced total effect represents the proportion of private transfers crowded-out from the introduction of public transfers, denominators vary across studies. Columns (8) and (9) report the response of private transfers to an income change (of program benefits); Columns
(10) and (11) report the response of private transfers to a change in program participation. Zero crowd-out effect specified if the author explicitly reports no crowding-out When studies implement maximum likelihood estimation, the reported estimates are assumed to be
marginal effects. (a) Standard errors are not estimated in source study to determine significance levels of effect size estimates. (b) Effect size calculated from estimates in the source study. (c) Transfers measured on an annual basis. (d) Analysis for this study was
performed at the individual level. (e) Coefficients represent the effect on transfers given. Orraca-Romano (2015) uses split-regression and does not report sample size with subgroup estimation; crowd-out effects are calculated by multiplying the extensive coefficient by
the mean amount of private transfers received by uninsured households prior to the program. This number is then divided by the estimated effect of Seguro Popular on health expenditures for the main sample. Strupat and Klohn (2018) implement a split-regression on
subgroups with varying degrees of kinship, e.g., the subgroup with the greatest kinship includes transfers only if they are received by a parent or child; the first specification uses a dependent variable consisting of transfers given, while the second uses transfers received.
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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